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In the companion cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbs, the United States Supreme Court found mandatory life-
without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders unconstitutional.1
The Court's decision followed a decade of sentencing reform for
juveniles; in 2005, Roper v. Simmons ended the execution of
juvenile offenders, and in 2010, Graham v. Florida barred states
from sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-homicide
crimes. In Miller, the Court extended the rationale set forth in
Roper and Graham, that juveniles are "constitutionally different"
from adults due to their lack of maturity, vulnerability to negative
influences, and capacity for change.3 Consequently, the Court
held, before "imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles"
convicted of homicide, courts must consider mitigating
circumstances specific to the juvenile and the offense.4
When the Court issued the Miller opinion in 2012, twenty-
eight states retained statutes imposing mandatory life-without-
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1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82 (2010).
3. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458, 2475 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 67-70)
("Graham recognized that lack of intent normally diminishes the 'moral culpability'
that attaches to the crime in question, making those that do not intend to kill
,categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are
murderers.'").
4. Id. at 2475.
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parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide offenses. To
reform now unconstitutional statutes, these states must develop
new sentencing schemes that will not only bar mandatory life
sentences, but also allow juveniles "some meaningful opportunity"
for release. Moreover, while the Court's decision demands prompt
statutory reform that will govern future juvenile offenders, it does
not address the fate of juveniles sentenced prior to Miller.7 In
effect, state legislatures and courts are left to decide the fate of
future offenders and determine if Miller will be applied
retroactively to allow sentencing relief for pre-Miller offenders.8
The primary goal of this Comment is to evaluate legislation
enacted in the wake of Miller and ultimately prescribe a statutory
sentencing scheme that encompasses the foundational principles
set forth in Roper, Graham and Miller. While the Court did not
explicitly abolish life-without-parole sentences, this Comment
argues that a sentencing scheme entirely eliminating life
sentences for juveniles adheres most closely with the Court's
rationale. Section I presents Miller's mandate and contextualizes
earlier cases leading up to Miller. Section II examines how states
have interpreted and applied the Court's holding in Miller,
illustrating the varied approaches taken to transform juvenile
sentencing statutes. Section III prescribes a sentencing scheme
that adheres to the holding in Miller-one that examines youthful
offenders individually through consideration of mitigating factors.
This Comment concludes by contending that a progressive scheme
that eliminates life-without-parole sentences for juvenile
offenders, and instead offers a meaningful opportunity for release,
5. Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court
Mandate on Life Without Parole, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2014), available
at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj-State-Responses to Miller.pdf.
Prior to the Court's decision in Miller, seven states-Alaska, Colorado, Kansas,
Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon, as well as the District of
Columbia-banned life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. Id.
6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74).
7. Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 31 LAw & INEQ. 535, 548 (2013) ("Although the Court's views
surely influence other lawmakers, the Supreme Court does not dictate most
juvenile crime regulations. But changing attitudes toward young offenders have
affected policymakers at all levels of government; across the country, there has
been a rethinking of harsh incarceration-based policies and a readiness to try
different approaches.").
8. Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v.
Jackson [sic]: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW &
INEQ. 369, 369 (2013) ("However, Miller did not provide nuanced answers to how
[developmental and neurological differences] matter. The issues that Miller did not
reach have left an assortment of practical problems to be resolved by legislatures,
courts, practitioners, and correctional administrators.").
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most accurately reflects the Court's reasoning in Miller and the
reduced culpability of youth.
I. Juvenile Culpability and Punishment Reform in the
United States
Over the past decade, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed the status of juvenile offenders and the role punishment
played in youth sentencing in three cases: Roper v. Simmons,'
Graham v. Florida," and Miller v. Alabama/Jackson v. Hobbs.11
These cases reinforce the foundational principle that "children are
constitutionally different from adults" and that courts must
consider mitigating factors specific to an offender's youth when
sentencing juveniles.12  These rulings guide lower courts to
consider the diminished cognitive capacity of youthful offenders in
sentencing and direct state legislatures to abolish existing juvenile
sentencing schemes that do not comply with the Court's
mandate. 3 The following sections will examine Roper, Graham,
and Miller, and discuss their impact on juvenile criminal justice
reform.
A. Roper v. Simmons
At the age of seventeen, Christopher Simmons was charged
and indicted on charges of first-degree murder, burglary,
kidnapping, and stealing in the death of Shirley Cook. 4 A jury
found Simmons guilty of first-degree murder and recommended
the death sentence. Simmons subsequently appealed his
conviction, sentence, and denial of post-conviction relief.1
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (finding the execution of
juvenile offenders unconstitutional).
10. Graham, 560 U.S. at 48 (finding life sentences for juvenile offenders
convicted of non-homicide crimes unconstitutional).
11. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455 (finding mandatory life sentences without the
possibility of parole unconstitutional for juvenile offenders).
12. Id. at 2458 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 and Graham, 560 U.S. at 48).
13. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (c)(1)(B) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170
(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (West 2013); H.R. 2116,
27th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H.R. 152, Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); S.B. 319, 97th
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-1340.19A (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (West 2012);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (3)(e)
(West 2013); S.B. 5064, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-
101 (b) (2013).
14. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 551.
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Simmons' appeal and succeeding petitions for state and federal
relief were denied.
17
More than five years later, the Court held in Atkins v.
Virginia8 that the execution of "mentally retarded" offenders was
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. Following this
decision, Simmons filed a new post-conviction petition contending
that the holding in Atkins prohibited the execution of juvenile
offenders ;21 Simmons argued that a national consensus had
emerged opposing the execution of juveniles and that this
consensus emphasized the unconstitutionality of capital
punishment for youthful offenders.21
On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court found
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court first
determined that juveniles lack maturity and a sense of
responsibility, making them "more reckless than adults.2 3
Second, the impressionable nature of juveniles makes them "more
vulnerable to outside influences because they have less control
over their surroundings. ,2 4 Finally, the character of a juvenile is
transitory and distinguishable from adults.5  Thus, the
"susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior
means 'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible
as that of an adult.'2'  Based on this reasoning, largely reliant on
medical findings regarding adolescent cognitive development, the
17. Id.
18. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Atkins, Petitioner Atkins appealed a capital
murder conviction and death sentence contending that the execution of mentally
retarded persons is in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment. 536 U.S. at 304.
20. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003), affld sub
nom. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 ("[Tjhe Supreme Court held that a national consensus
had emerged against the execution of mentally retarded offenders ... Simmons
now asks [the Missouri Supreme Court] to hold that a similar consensus against
the execution of juveniles has developed ... that the rationale for the Supreme
Court's determination that the execution of juveniles was not cruel and unusual
punishment has disappeared, and that the Eighth Amendment bars his
execution.").
21. Id. at 399-400; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304-05.
22. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
23. Id. at 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
24. Id. See also Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1011-14 (2003) (asserting
that juveniles should not be held to the same standards of criminal responsibility
as adults because of adolescent diminished capacity).
25. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
26. Id. at 570 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
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Court found the death penalty to be a cruel and unusual form of
punishment for youthful offenders.27
B. Graham v. Florida
Terrance Jamar Graham was sixteen years old when he was
indicted on charges of armed burglary with battery and attempted
armed robbery.28 After Graham pled guilty to both offenses, the
court withheld adjudication and placed him on probation.2 1 Six
months after his release, Graham violated his probation when he
participated in a home invasion robbery.0 The court subsequently
sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.31
Graham petitioned the District Court of Appeal of Florida,
challenging the statute that provided authority for his sentence of
life imprisonment; 2 Graham argued that life sentences without
parole for juveniles should be considered per se unlawful and
banned pursuant to the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. In examining the severe and serious
nature of the offenses, the court found Graham to be "incapable of
rehabilitation" and found that he had effectively forfeited his
"second chance" by repeating his past crimes. 4 The District Court
of Appeal denied Graham's petition and "decline[d] to implement a
per se ban on the sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment. 35
On review, the United States Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide offenses. Largely reliant on findings in
27. Id. at 571 ("Retribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty
is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity."). See also Steinberg &
Scott, supra note 24, at 1011-14 (arguing that immaturity and adolescent cognitive
ability mitigate punishment and render youth offenders ineligible for capital
punishment).
28. Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), rev'd, 130 S.
Ct. 2011 (2010).
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 45-46.
31. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020 (2010) (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002 (1)(e)
(2003)).
32. Id. at 2020-21; FLA. STAT. § 921.002 (1)(e) (2003).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Graham, 982 So. 2d at 46.
34. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
35. Graham, 982 So. 2d at 54 (emphasis added) ("Accordingly, appellant
[Graham] cannot assert that established precedent supports a conclusion that the
use of the sentence has become so unique as to be unusual as defined by the Eighth
Amendment."). Id. at 49.
36. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18.
2015]
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Roper, the Court highlighted the "limited culpability" of juveniles
and the disparate nature of life sentences on those who have a
diminished moral responsibility.37 The Court further stated the
"inadequacy of penological theory to justify life without parole
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the limited
culpability of such offenders, and the severity of these sentences"
support the conclusion that juveniles are less deserving of such
punishments." Finally, as a less culpable category of offenders,
courts "must impose a sentence that provides some meaningful
opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation."
Graham was significant most notably because it
demonstrated a "shift in the Court's proportionality
jurisprudence.., for more Eighth Amendment challenges in
noncapital cases";0 Graham applied a "categorical challenge to a
term-of-years sentence" by prohibiting a certain type of
punishment-life without parole-for an entire class of
defendants-juvenile non-homicide offenders.41
C. Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs
On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court found
mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile offenders
unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama12 and its companion case,
Jackson v. Hobbs. In 2006, Evan Miller was indicted as a
juvenile for capital murder, and was subsequently removed to
adult court where he was charged with murder in the course of
arson. A jury found Miller guilty, and the trial court
subsequently imposed a mandatory punishment of life without the
possibility of parole.45 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
37. Id. at 2029-30 ("Even if the punishment has some connection to a valid
penological goal, it must be shown that the punishment is not grossly
disproportionate in light of the justification offered. Here, in light of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders' diminished moral responsibility, any limited deterrent
effect provided by life without parole is not enough to justify the sentence.").
38. Id. at 2016.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT. REP. 49, 50 (2010).
41. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. See also Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount:
Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
107, 124(2013).
42. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
43. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
44. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457; see also Judgment and Sentencing Order, State v.
Miller, No. CC 2006-68, 1 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2006).
45. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458.
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affirmed Miller's sentence, holding that it was not overly harsh
when compared to his crime, and that its mandatory nature was
permissible under the Eighth Amendment.6 Miller subsequently
appealed the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' decision seeking
review by the United States Supreme Court.47
In Miller's companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, Kuntrell
Jackson was convicted of murder and sentenced mandatorily to a
term of life without parole. 8 Jackson was similarly charged as an
adult at the age of fourteen under counts of capitol felony murder
and aggravated robbery. After the appeals court confirmed his
conviction and sentence on habeas review, Jackson appealed to the
Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction.0 Upon
review by the United States Supreme Court, Miller and Jackson's
cases were combined and decided jointly. 1
In its analysis, the Court relied on precedent established in
Roper and Graham;2 as a consequence of their vulnerability to
negative influences, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and
capacity for change, juveniles are "constitutionally different" from
adults and "less deserving of the most severe punishments. ,5 The
degree of imprisonment assigned to juveniles, according to the
Court, must be in proportion to their reduced level of culpability.
54
More specifically, because children lack maturity in ways that lead
to impulsive behavior, they "lack the ability to extricate
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings[J" making
them less culpable than adult offenders.
In Graham, the Court held that age matters in deciding
whether a lifetime sentence is appropriate.56  However, the
46. See Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev'd and
remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
47. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 94, 194 S.W.3d 757, 762 (2004).
51. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2457; Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548, 548 (2011).
52. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005);
Graham v. State, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2011 (2010).
53. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 ("[A juvenile's] 'lack of maturity'
and ... 'underdeveloped sense of responsibility" lead to "recklessness, impulsivity,
and heedless risk-taking... Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes."). See also
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
54. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458.
55. Id. at 2464.
56. Id. at 2465-66 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027) ("Most fundamentally,
Graham insists that youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime
2015]
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mandatory penalty schemes used to sentence Miller and Jackson
were in direct conflict with the Court's holding in Graham;
compulsory sentences of life without the possibility of parole
inherently prevent sentencing authorities from assessing the
actions of each juvenile individually:
[M]andatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the
sentencer from taking account of these central considerations.
By removing youth from the balance-by subjecting a juvenile
to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an
adult-these laws prohibit a sentencing authority from
assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That
contravenes Graham's (and also Roper's) foundational
principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on
juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not
children. 7
By adhering to a structure that compulsively sentences juveniles
without weighing their age, background, and nature of the crime,
states intrinsically place children in the same class as adult
offenders. 8 Further, mandatory sentencing schemes often impose
identical, if not harsher, sentences on juveniles and adults
convicted of the same crime.
In evaluating culpability, the Court pointed specifically to
Miller and Jackson's background to further emphasize the need to
examine all circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime and the background of the juvenile.0 Miller's stepfather
was physically abusive, his mother was chemically dependent and
abandoned her son, forcing him to live in foster care. Additionally,
of incarceration without the possibility of parole. In the circumstances there,
juvenile status precluded a life-without-parole sentence, even though an adult
could receive it for a similar crime. And in other contexts as well, the
characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken rationales for punishment, can
render a life-without-parole sentence disproportionate.").
57. Id. at 2466.
58. Id. at 2467-68 ("Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it.").
59. Id. at 2468 ("[E]ach juvenile ... will receive the same sentence as the vast
majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses-but really, as Graham
noted, a greater sentence than those adults will serve.").
60. Id. at 2468-69 ("Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features-among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It
prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds
him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the
extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures
may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth .... ").
[Vol. 33: 263
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Miller attempted suicide on more than one occasion."
Comparably, Jackson's conviction relied on his participation in the
commission of a robbery, as he did not actually discharge the gun
that led to the victim's death. 2 In addressing the importance of
these contextual factors, the Court determined that the familial
background of juvenile offenders and the level of involvement in
the crime should be examined and utilized to designate a just
sentence. 3
Miller also requires that sentencers review the offender's age
and educational background, as these may be indicative of the
juvenile's cognitive maturity, or lack thereof. 4 Moreover, the
Court held that juveniles must be given "some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.6 5  Finally, "given all that [the Court has] said in
Roper, Graham, and this decision about children's diminished
culpability and heightened capacity for change, [the Court held]
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest
possible penalty will be uncommon."6 In adherence with this
requirement, the Court reversed the judgments of both the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Arkansas Supreme
Court, and remanded both cases for resentencing. 7
II. Legislative Impact of Miller v. Alabama
After the Court's decision in Miller, sentencing statutes for
juvenile offenders in twenty-eight states were effectively
61. Id. at 2469.
62. Id. at 2468.
63. Id. at 2469.
64. Id. at 2469 ("Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that
judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.").
65. Id. at 2469 (citing Graham v. State, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2475. See also Miller v. State, CR-06-0741 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8,
2013) ("Thus, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Miller, Miller's sentence is reversed, and this cause [sic] is remanded with
instructions for the circuit court to conduct a new sentencing hearing ....");
Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, *9, 426 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Ark. 2013) (remanding
to the Mississippi County Circuit Court with instructions to resentence Kuntrell
Jackson) ("We thus instruct the Mississippi County Circuit Court to hold a
sentencing hearing where Jackson may present Miller evidence for consideration.
We further instruct that Jackson's sentence must fall within the statutory
discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony. For a Class Y felony, the
sentence is not a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole, but
instead a discretionary sentencing range of not less than ten years and not more
than forty years, or life.").
2015]
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unconstitutional. 8  To date, fifteen states-Arkansas, California,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington
and Wyoming-have passed legislation to reconstruct sentencing
schemes in adherence with Miller." Of these states, four have
abolished life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders
entirely.
The variation among states is immense and fails to provide a
uniform application of the Court's rationale in Miller. This section
will classify state legislation passed in the wake of Miller into one
of two categories: more progressive and less progressive
legislation. Some states adopted legislation adhering to the
foundational principles set forth in Miller-children are
constitutionally different from adults, and mitigating factors of
youth must be considered in sentencing.71 Conversely, other states
have reconstructed sentencing statutes to allow for punishments
that operate as de facto life sentences by requiring a minimum
number of years in prison, often without consideration of
mitigating circumstances specific to the offender's youth.2
While Miller did not explicitly provide state legislatures with
an alternative to life-without-parole sentences, the Court did
68. Kent Faulk, Report: States Slow to Reform Sentencing Laws for Juveniles
After 2012 Supreme Court Ruling in Alabama Capital Murder Case, AL.COM (June
25, 2014, 5:17 PM), http://www.al.com/newsbirmingham/index.ssf/201406/report
_states-slow to reform s.html. See also Rovner, supra note 5 ("Miller struck down
laws in [twenty-eight] states .... "); Ryan Schill, California Guarantees Chance at
Parole for Juveniles Facing Life Sentences, Juv. JUST INFO. EXCHANGE (Oct. 2,
2012), www.jjie.org/california-guarantees-chance-at-parole-for-juveniles-facing-life-
sentences/ ("At least seven [sic] states already prohibit juvenile life without
parole .... They are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico and
Oregon.").
69. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (c)(1)(B) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170
(d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2013); H.R. 2116, 27th
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H.R. 7035, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); H.R. 152, Reg. Sess.
(La. 2013); S.B. 319, 97th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.02
(2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19A (West 2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1102.1 (West 2012); S.B. 39, Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2013); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
12.31 (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (3)(e) (West 2013); H.R. 1338, 63d
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (b) (2013). Conversely,
fifteen states-Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Ohio, Vermont, and Virginia-have not passed legislation to replace currently
unconstitutional sentencing statutes. See Rovner, supra note 5.
70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); H.R. 2116, 27th Leg.
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); WyO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101 (b) (2013).




instruct states to consider the reduced culpability of children when
imposing sentences on juvenile offenders. By considering the
impact of this mandate on sentencing reform post-Miller, this
section supports a recommendation for a sentencing scheme that
adheres to the purpose and spirit of Miller.
A. More Progressive Legislation
Although Miller's mandate did not require states to eliminate
juvenile life sentences altogether, the Court did state that use of
the life sentences should be "uncommon" and only employed after
a sentencer takes into "account how children are different, and
how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them
to a lifetime in prison."73 At the time of Miller, seven states had
abolished juvenile life-without-parole sentences, and five more
followed after the ruling.74 The decision to eliminate life sentences
for youthful offenders, even by characteristically conservative
states, reflects the elevation of restorative justice. Reformed
sentencing guidelines reflect a national trend towards "treating
juvenile offenders differently, favoring accountability over
punishment and even expressing a willingness to pay for
rehabilitative services rather than incarceration.7 6
In the wake of Roper and Graham, California introduced a
bill allowing juveniles convicted of homicide and currently serving
life-without-parole sentences the opportunity to petition for
resentencing Upon review, courts may reduce a life sentence to
twenty-five years if the petitioner exhibits progress toward
rehabilitation and remorse.7 ' By offering an opportunity for
judicial review, juvenile offenders already serving life sentences
are able to submit retroactive resentencing petitions that
demonstrate mitigating factors surrounding the circumstances of
the offense alongside their efforts toward rehabilitation. Under
73. Miller v. State, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
74. Rovner, supra note 5.
75. Sara E. Fiorillo, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative Considerations and
Remedies for the Future of Juvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U. L. REV. 2095, 2102 (2013).
76. Id.
77. S.B. 9, 2011-2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012). After serving fifteen years in prison,
selected juvenile offenders may seek judicial review and petition the court to reduce
their sentence. Id.
78. Id. See also Don Thompson, SB 9, California Juvenile Second Chance Bill,
Signed by Governor Brown, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2012, 11:13 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/30/sb-9-california n 1927840.html.




preceding California law, youthful offenders had no system of
review and were essentially sentenced to die in prison for crimes
committed as juveniles."
Following the outcome in Miller, California again passed
legislation amending the state's penal code to completely eliminate
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. The bill's addition to
the previous 2012 legislation, which allows for retroactive
resentencing petitions,81 institutes a parole process for juveniles:
offenders are eligible for release during the fifteenth year of
incarceration, during the twentieth year of incarceration if the
original sentence was less than twenty-five years to life, and
during the twenty-fifth year of incarceration if the person received1 2
a sentence that was twenty-five years to life. At each opportunity
80. Jennifer Turner, California Gives Hope to Child Offenders Sentenced to Die
in Prison, ACLU (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.aclu.orgblog/criminal-law-reform-
human-rights/california-gives-hope-child-offenders-sentenced-die-prison ("There
are 309 child offenders serving life-without-parole sentences in California for
murders committed when they were younger than [eighteen].").
81. Discussing the change, the California Senate said that:
[e]xisting law provides that the Secretary of the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings, or both, may, for
specified reasons, recommend to the court that a prisoner's sentence be
recalled, and that a court may recall a prisoner's sentence. When a
defendant who was under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the
commission of a crime has served at least [fifteen] years of his or her
sentence, existing law allows the defendant to submit a petition for recall
and resentencing, and authorizes the court, in its discretion, to recall the
sentence and to resentence the defendant, provided that the new sentence
is not greater than the initial sentence.
S.B. 260, 2013-2014 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). See also Gov. Brown Signs Bill
Giving Juveniles Second Chance, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2012, 9:04 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/09/30/gov-brown-signs-bill-
juveniles/1604907/ ("[Legislation enacted in 2012 allows] the inmates [to] ask
judges to reconsider their sentences after they serve at least [fifteen] years in
prison. Judges could then reduce the no-parole sentence to [twenty-five] years-to-
life if the inmate shows remorse and is taking steps toward rehabilitation.").
82. The legislation explains that:
[e]xisting law requires the board to meet with each inmate sentenced
pursuant to certain provisions of law during his or her [third] year of
incarceration for the purpose of reviewing his or her file, making
recommendations, and documenting activities and conduct pertinent to
granting or withholding postconviction credit. This bill would instead
require the board to meet with those inmates, including those who are
eligible to be considered for parole pursuant to a youth offender parole
hearing, during the [sixth] year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible
parole release date. The bill would also require the board to provide an
inmate additional, specified information during this consultation,
including individualized recommendations regarding the inmate's work
assignments, rehabilitative programs, and institutional behavior, and to
provide those findings and recommendations, in writing, to the inmate
within [thirty] days following the consultation.
S.B. 260, 2013-2014 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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for review, the Board of Parole relies on Miller by "giv[ing] great
weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to
adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner. ... "" The Board
also accepts testimony from family, friends and community
members relating to the offender's life prior to the crime, and his
or her individual development since commission of the crime."84
Pursuant to the new law, a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole is barred entirely for youth offenders .
As determined by Miller, mandatory sentencing schemes are
faulty in their failure to assign significance to the individual and
instead provide an overarching punishment that fails to take into
account the character of the offender and the circumstances of the
offense." In contrast with increasingly punitive statutes in other
states, the California movement to reform punishment for
youthful offenders displays a progressive shift consistent with the
Court's reasoning in Miller.87  Similarly, the Hawaii Fair
Sentencing of Youth Act eliminates life-without-parole and,
together with current state law that orders continuous
opportunities for parole, requires sentencing review for juvenile
offenders every twelve months once they become eligible for
parole." Juvenile offenders may file a motion requesting sentence
83. The legislature specifically noted that:
[i]n the wake of the US and the California Supreme Courts' decisions and
consistent with neuroscientific research, SB 260 establishes a
comprehensive judicial review process to evaluate cases involving extreme
sentences for juveniles. SB 260 holds young people responsible for the
crimes they committed and creates a system in which they must
demonstrate remorse and rehabilitation to merit any possible sentence
reduction as determined by the court.
Id. See also Senate Committee on Public Safety: Hearing on S.B. 9, 2011-2012
Session (2011).
84. S.B. 260, 2013-2014 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
85. Id.
86. Miller v. State, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) ("[W]e insisted in these rulings
that a sentencer have the ability to consider the 'mitigating qualities of youth.').
87. S.B. 9, 2011-2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012); S.B. 260, 2013-2014 Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2013); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465-77.
88. The Act states that:
[t]he minimum term of imprisonment before a prisoner who was less than
eighteen years of age at the time of the offense becomes eligible for parole
shall be no longer than twenty years, or such shorter period as may be
applicable. The authority shall ensure that the hearing to consider parole
upon expiration of the minimum term ... shall provide a meaningful
opportunity to obtain release ....
H.R. 2116, 27th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014). See also Hawaii Legislature Abolishes




modification, whereby courts consider mitigating circumstances
specific to the offender and the offense. 9  Factors expressly
prescribed by the Act call for courts to examine the offender's
emotional and intellectual capacity at the time of the offense,
presence of external influences, and evidence of rehabilitation and
expressed remorse.0 Consistent with Miller's holding, the Act
addresses the lessened moral culpability of juveniles and their
potential to become contributing members of society."
A number of revised statutes elected to retain juvenile life
sentences as an option for courts. In several states that have
retained life-without-parole sentences, the sentence can only be
used after courts have considered the mitigating factors outlined
in Miller.12  Delaware's new statutory scheme grants courts the
ability to sentence juvenile homicide offenders a minimum
sentence of twenty-five years to a maximum sentence of life in
prison, only after utilizing "individualized criteria suggested by
the Supreme Court."3 While the statute fails to provide explicit
factors to be considered by sentencers, Delaware's new sentencing
provision is most progressive in its retroactive application;
youthful offenders sentenced pre-Miller to more than twenty years
in prison are now entitled to a review hearing that will determine
a sentence ranging from twenty-five years to life imprisonment. 4
89. H.R. 2116, 27th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
90. Id. (stating "[T]he court shall consider the following additional factors: (a)
Age of the defendant at the time of the offense; (b) Impetuosity of the defendant at
the time of the offense; (c) Family and community environment of the defendant;
(d) Ability of the defendant to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct;
(e) Intellectual capacity of the defendant; (f) The outcome of any comprehensive
mental health evaluation conducted by an adolescent mental health professional
licensed in the State of Hawaii; (g) Family or peer pressure on the defendant; (h)
Level of the defendant's participation in the offense; (i) Ability of the defendant to
participate meaningfully in the defendant's defense; (j) Capacity for rehabilitation;
(k) School records and any special education evaluations of the defendant; (1)
Trauma history of the defendant; (m) Community involvement of the defendant; (n)
Involvement in the child welfare system; and (o) Any other mitigating factor or
circumstance the court deems relevant to its decision.").
91. Id.
92. Samuel Brinton & Bryan Poellot, Juvenile Justice in the Commonwealth:
Analyzing Judicial Reform in the Aftermath of Miller v. Alabama, HARV. IOP (May
2014), http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/defaultfiles-new/research-policy-papers/Ju
venileJusticeSpring2014.pdf.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2013); S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del.
2013) ("This Act will bring Delaware into compliance with the Miller [sic] holding
by removing juvenile offenders from the mandatory sentencing scheme for first
degree murder to one which gives judges a range of options up to life
imprisonment."); Delaware Eliminates Death in Prison Sentences for Children,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (June 13, 2013), http://www.eji.org/node/779.
94. Delaware Eliminates Death in Prison Sentences for Children, supra note 93.
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In application, Delaware's new statutory scheme is employed
retroactively to all juvenile offenders serving life-without-parole
sentences. Since Miller, this level of retroactive application has
been applied by four states-Delaware, North Carolina,
Washington and Wyoming-through statutory reform.96
In addition to retroactivity, the language of the new
Delaware law allows for sentencing review for all juveniles
sentenced to more than twenty years in prison: "[rieviews will
occur after [thirty] years for first degree murder convictions and
after [twenty] years for all other cases and are intended to
determine whether an individual has been rehabilitated and
should be eligible for release."9'7 Similar to California and Hawaii,
Delaware's recent legislation aligns with the Court's rationale in
Miller by not only removing mandatory life sentences for juvenile
offenders, but also by providing meaningful opportunity for review
and release.98
B. Less Progressive Legislation
Prior to Miller, Texas utilized a mandatory sentencing
structure for juvenile offenders convicted of capital murder.99
However, within a year of Miller, Texas passed legislation
introducing new guidelines for juveniles convicted of murder.0 0
Pursuant to the amended statute, offenders under the age of
eighteen found guilty of capital murder shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving forty years in
• 101
prison.
95. Delaware Enacts Sentence Review Process for Youth, THE CAMPAIGN FOR
THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH (June 10, 2013), http://fairsentencingofyouth.org
/2013/06/10/delaware-entacts-sentence-review-process-for-youth/.
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-
1340.19A (West 2013); H.R. 1338, 63d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101 (2013).
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A (2013).
98. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (d)(2)(A)(i) (West 2013); H.R. 2116, 27th Leg.
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
99. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); Michelle Mondo, House
Committee Again Passes Juvenile Sentence Bill, MY SA: TEX. POLITICS (July 9,
2013), http://blog.mysanantonio.com/texas-politics/2013/07/house-committee-again-
passes-juvenile-sentence-bill/.
100. Senate Bill 2 History, TEX. LEGIS. ONLINE, http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/
BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=832&Bill=SB2.
101. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (West 2013); Texas Changes Sentencing for
Juveniles Convicted of Homicide, CHILDREN AT RISK (July 17, 2013), http://www.
childrenatrisk.org/2013/07/17/texas-changes-sentencing-for-juveniles-convicted-of-
homicide/ ("However, Senate Bill 2 basically exchanges one mandatory sentence for
another. We've exchanged life without parole for life with the possibility of parole.
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While Texas takes a progressive step in sentencing reform by
eliminating life-without-parole sentences, the new alternative also
regresses by issuing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole until forty years into the sentence for
all juveniles convicted of capital murder.112 The courts have no
opportunity to examine individualized factors to determine a
juvenile's sentence; all juvenile homicide offenders, regardless of
age, background, or cognitive capacity, must serve forty years in
prison.0 If a seventeen-year-old offender is convicted of capital
murder in Texas, he or she does not see an opportunity for parole
until he or she is fifty-seven years old.0 4 With an average life
expectancy of juveniles serving life sentences of approximately
fifty years old, this amended provision arguably operates as a de
facto life sentence, allowing juveniles minimal hope for relief or
motivation to seek rehabilitative support.10
Similarly, Arkansas introduced and passed legislation
prescribing two alternatives to mandatory life sentences:
permissive life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, or
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a
minimum of twenty-eight years in prison.0 The legislature
explicitly designated the purpose of the new statute to apply to
punishments for future offenders under the age of eighteen,
excluding juveniles sentenced prior to the effective date of the new
statute.0 7
While the Arkansas legislature prescribed a facially
progressive sentencing scheme by providing a potential twenty-
In Texas, that opportunity for parole doesn't even come up until the prisoner has
served [forty] years, and good behavior is not a consideration.").




105. See Michigan Life Expectancy Data for Youth Serving Natural Life
Sentences, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, http://www.
fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-contentluploads/2010/02/Michigan-Life-Expectancy-
Data-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf (stating "[tihe life expectancy averages drop even
lower for those who began their natural life sentences as children, therefore,
serving longer years in prison then [sic] adults with the same sentence. Looking at
Michigan youth who were punished with a natural life sentence, the average life
expectancy is 50.6 years. The number of the cohort is too small to establish an
average based on race, although 72% of youth serving natural life sentences in
Michigan, [sic] are children of color.").
106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (c)(1)(B) (2013); H.R. 1993, 89th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
107. H.R. 1993, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013). Offenders under the
age of eighteen convicted and sentenced prior to statute revisions are not granted
retroactive relief or sentencing review in Arkansas. Id.
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eight year sentence for convicted juveniles,"8 the amended statute
remains fundamentally stringent: Arkansas retained life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles, failed to prescribe qualifying
circumstances to direct the court in sentencing juveniles, and left
offenders convicted under the previous unconstitutional scheme
without the opportunity for resentencing relief.19 Further, the
legislature has not provided explicit guidelines to sentencing
courts or parole councils in evaluating post-Miller juveniles
convicted of capital murder."' In turn, juveniles may be sentenced
under varied, inconsistent standards because courts are not
guided to consider factors specific to the offender's youth.
III. Proposed Statutory Reform
The Court's decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller were
monumental in several respects, most notably because they
restored "principles of rehabilitationism to a system that, over the
last [twenty] years, has come almost entirely unmoored from its
ideological foundations."1 ' First, in Roper and Graham, the Court
relied on developmental research to conclude "policymakers may
be heading in the wrong direction with juvenile court policy" by
failing to account for attributes specific to youth.11 2 The Court
recognized the impact of an individual's cognitive capacity-
specifically the impact of "logical reasoning and the ability to
identify and weigh competing alternatives"-and degree of
psychological development-on an individual's "social, emotional,
and temporal perceptions and judgments."1 3 In identifying the
cognitive and psychological attributes that motivate and guide
adolescents, as compared to their adult counterparts, the Court
determined juveniles lack a level of maturity and comprehension
that allow them to weigh the consequences of their actions fully."4
Reaffirmed in Miller, the Court's rationale "treats youth as a
mitigating factor and supports a rehabilitative response to
108. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (c)(1)(B) (2013).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Perry Moriearty, Restoring Rehabilitation to the American Juvenile Justice
System, JURIST (Sept. 24, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/09/perry-
moriearty-juvenile-justice.php.
112. Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 23
(2012).




juvenile crime.""11  Consequently, the Court instructed state
legislatures and courts to adhere to "[theories of diminished
culpability and rehabilitative potential" when developing and
enforcing sentencing statutes for juveniles. 6
While the Court left states to determine how Miller should be
applied to statutory sentencing reform, it did demand nationwide
uniformity by barring mandatory penalties which, "by their
nature, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's
age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant
to it." 7 To properly apply this standard, state legislatures should
(1) abolish life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders
entirely; (2) require courts to examine a comprehensive list of
mitigating factors specific to each offender; (3) provide offenders a
meaningful opportunity for release through continued review by
parole entities; and (4) retroactively apply Miller to juvenile
offenders convicted prior to the Court's holding.
A. Eliminate Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juvenile
Offenders
Abolishing life-without-parole sentences would adhere with
the spirit of Miller and empirical research connecting reduced
culpability to the age of the offender. 18 The Court stated it is
inherently difficult to distinguish between "the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and
the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption." ' To avoid release of offenders who are incapable of
reform or remorse, it is reasonable for states to retain a sentence
that allows for courts to assess the character and development of
the offender over time.
Roper, Graham, and Miller "emphasized that the distinctive
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for
imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when
they commit terrible crimes.1 20  By leaving discretionary life-
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012).
118. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, Jr., Getting Juvenile
Life Without Parole "Right" After Miller v. Alabama, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61, 69 (2012); Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, ABA
ONLINE (2004), http://www.abanet.org/crimjustjuvjus/Adolescence.pdf.
119. Lauren Kinell, Answering the Unanswered Questions: How States Can
Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 143, 164 (2013) (quoting
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
120. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
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without-parole sentences on the table, legislatures retain
sentences that fail to account for transitory characteristics of
youth. Advocates for life-without-parole sentences may contend
that life sentences combat the risk of releasing an "irretrievably
depraved" offender. 121  However, the parole process inherently
combats this argument, as courts can evaluate the development, or
lack thereof, of an offender and determine if they should remain
incarcerated. 12 Moreover, imposing a life-without-parole sentence
on a juvenile who is capable of rehabilitation is the exact type of
sentencing flaw the Court attempts to remedy in Miller.
12 3
B. Include Examination of Mitigating Circumstances and
Meaningful Opportunity for Rehabilitation and Release
When stipulating mitigating circumstances that may be
presented and considered in sentencing, legislatures should
develop a broad and expansive list of factors that envelope the
cognitive capacity of the offender alongside a depiction of the
offender's formative years.12 4  As articulated by the Court in
Graham and Miller, factors that should be considered include,
but are not limited to:
121. Coleman & Coleman, supra note 118, at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 598-603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
122. Id.
123. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 ("[Tlhis mandatory punishment disregards the
possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.").
124. Sonia Mardarewich, Certainty in a World of Uncertainty: Proposing
Statutory Guidance in Sentencing Juveniles to Life Without Parole, 16 SCHOLAR
123, 143 (2013) (stating "[t]he first and most important component of any model
sentencing statute is the adoption of mitigating factors for courts to consider when
sentencing juveniles convicted of homicidal offenses. When considering mitigating
factors that should be included in proposed guidelines, two main factors that must
be considered are: (1) the juvenile's background and (2) the juvenile's mental and
emotional development .. ").
125. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (stating "[mandatory life without parole for a
juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home
environment that surrounds him-and from which he cannot usually extricate
himself-no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of
the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that
he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for
incompetencies associated with youth-for example, his inability to deal with police
officers or prosecutors ... or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys ... And
finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even




* The juvenile's age and its features, including immaturity,
impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,
at the time of the offense;
12
1
* The juvenile's intellectual capacity and development,
including educational history;
127
* The juvenile's family and home environment;1 28
* The circumstances of the offense, including the extent of
the juvenile's level of participation and the impact of familial
and peer pressures in the commission of the crime;
129
* The juvenile's inability to function in the criminal justice
system that is designed for adult offenders; 30 and
* The possibility of rehabilitation.
Furthermore, states should grant juvenile offenders a meaningful
opportunity for review and potential release after serving a
specified number of years. Review opportunities should evaluate
the juvenile's participation in rehabilitative and educational
programs while incarcerated, as well as their present threat to the
community. Finally, any juvenile offender denied release should
be granted continued review every five years.
Individualized sentencing does not restrict courts from
incarcerating juvenile offenders who fail to exhibit a substantial
level of rehabilitation and remorse. When a juvenile offender is
initially sentenced, or eligible for parole or sentence modification,
courts should have the capacity to examine the cognitive
development of the offender and efforts towards rehabilitation. As
juvenile offenders age, courts can more effectively examine their
characteristics and "evidence of irretrievable depravity" that may
be indicative of an offender who should remain incarcerated. 
1 2
For example, California's sentencing scheme requires courts to
hold a hearing to determine whether the offender has displayed
126. Id.
127. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) ("It is to say that just as
the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great
weight, so must the background and mental and emotional development of a
youthful defendant be duly considered in sentencing.").




132. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553
(2005)) ("The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is
less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is
evidence of irretrievably depraved character."). See also Coleman & Coleman,




efforts towards rehabilitation and remorse, eliminated ties with
individuals involved in crime, and remained in exemplary
disciplinary standing. 133 California also calls for recurring
opportunities for parole during the fifteenth, twentieth, and
twenty-fifth year of incarceration if the offender received a
sentence that is twenty-five years to life.134  Sentencing schemes
that do not account for mental and emotional development fail to
follow Miller's mandate-that courts must account for mitigating
circumstances attributed to youth and grant juvenile offenders a
meaningful opportunity for release. This means allowing for
continued evaluation of juvenile offenders through individualized
sentences that can be re-examined over time.
C. Apply Miller Retroactively
Following the Court's holding in Miller, both Evan Miller and
Kuntrell Jackson's sentences were invalidated and remanded to
state court for resentencing1 When Miller was decided, Evan
Miller's case was on direct review and Kuntrell Jackson's case was
on collateral review.136 In the past, the Court has held that when
it applies a new rule of constitutional law to the defendant in the
case announcing the new rule, "even-handed justice" requires that
the rule apply retroactively to all similar cases. While the
application and limits of retroactivity is beyond the scope of this
Comment, it is important to note that the Court's holding
distinctly reversed the decisions of both the Alabama and
Arkansas Supreme Courts and ordered that both Evan Miller and
Kuntrell Jackson be granted relief through resentencing.
1 3 8
Moreover, the Court effectively made the ban on mandatory life
without parole for juvenile offenders applicable to all similarly-
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3050 (b)(1-3) (West 2014); S.B. 260, 2013-2014 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). See also Ryann Blackshere, California Passes New Parole
Law for Young Offenders, THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE (Sept. 17, 2013),
https :Hchronicleofsocialchange.org/news/california-passes-new-parole-law-for-
young-offenders/3978.
134. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3050 (b)(1-3) (West 2014).
135. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2475 (stating "[bly requiring that all children convicted
of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of
their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the
mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality,
and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. We
accordingly reverse the judgments of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.").
136. Id. at 2461-62.
137. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989).
138. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
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situated defendants.13" 9 Based on this line of precedent, state
legislatures and courts should similarly allow pre-Miller offenders
to seek resentencing.
IV. Conclusion
Following the Court's holding in Miller, we have seen a
nationwide trend toward more lenient sentencing schemes for
youthful offenders. However, while some state legislatures have
adopted new sentencing statutes that closely adhere to the Court's
reasoning in Miller, other states have retained harsh sentencing
for juveniles without creating significant opportunities for review
or release. To avoid despotic sentencing schemes, states should
follow the recent shift in juvenile justice reform by creating
sentencing procedures that require individualized assessment
based on a list of comprehensive, mitigating factors.140 By creating
an exhaustive sentencing process that looks at the characteristics
of the defendant, alongside other extenuating elements, courts can
more effectively determine the proper sentence duration for
juvenile offenders.
While arguably progressive in its application, adoption of a
sentencing scheme that (1) abolishes life-without-parole sentences
for juvenile offenders entirely, (2) requires that courts examine a
comprehensive list of mitigating factors specific to each offender,
(3) provides offenders a meaningful opportunity through continued
review by parole entities, and (4) retroactively applies Miller to
juvenile offenders convicted prior to the Court's holding, will allow
for the most equitable sentencing for youthful offenders. This
level of sentencing review grants defendants the ability to
demonstrate their individual level of culpability and capacity for
change. In effect, juvenile offenders will be permitted a fair
opportunity to be sentenced to serve a period of time equal to their
own guilt.
139. Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 ("We ... refuse to announce a new rule in a given
case unless the rule would be applied retroactively to the defendant in the case and
to all other similarly situated.").
140. These mitigating factors may include those cited by Justice Kagan in the
opinion: "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences ... the family and home environment ... circumstances of the
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the
way familial and peer pressures may have affected him." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
Other mitigating factors that may be considered include, but are not limited to: the
age of the offender at commission of the crime; the past criminal history of the
offender; the educational background of the offender; the offender's family history;
the results of an educational and mental health evaluation. Id.
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